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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 10-3341 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALLEN DINZEY, 
Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. Criminal No. 3-05-cr-00076-003) 
District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 12, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 15, 2011)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 Allen Dinzey appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance and conspiracy to import with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance into the United States, in violation of Title 18 of 
the United States Code, and from his resulting sentence of 160 months’ imprisonment.  
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Dinzey contends that the District Court erred by (1) trying this matter in violation of his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial, (2) sustaining the jury’s verdict of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt in spite of insufficient evidence, and (3) imposing an unreasonable 
sentence.  We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and 
procedural history of this case.  We will affirm. 
 After a mistrial was declared in Dinzey’s first trial on March 14, 2007, we 
affirmed the District Court’s denial of Dinzey’s subsequent motion to dismiss on 
December 20, 2007, and issued our mandate on January 15, 2008.  The District Court 
then scheduled the retrial of Dinzey’s case for February 25, 2008, but the retrial did not 
actually commence until February 2, 2009.    
“We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusion regarding a defendant’s 
claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated,” while reviewing “the 
factual findings underpinning that conclusion for clear error.”  United States v. Battis, 
589 F.3d 673, 677 (3d Cir. 2009).
1
  In pertinent part, the Speedy Trial Act requires the re-
trial of a defendant “following a declaration by the trial judge of a mistrial or following 
an order of such judge for a new trial” – or “following an appeal or a collateral attack” – 
to “commence within seventy days from the date the action occasioning the retrial 
becomes final.”  18 U.S.C. § 3161(e).  However, “[a]ny period of delay resulting from 
other proceedings concerning the defendant” or “from any pretrial motion, from the filing 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 
and 48 U.S.C. § 1611.  We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition, of 
such motion” is excludable from the Speedy Trial calculation.  §§ 3161(e), (h)(1).   
Here,  although the delay between January 15, 2008 and February 2, 2009 
technically exceeded the seventy-day window prescribed in the Speedy Trial Act, the 
record confirms that Dinzey and his co-defendants filed a number of motions and 
appeals, which were still pending prior to the February 2, 2009 retrial.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Arbelaez, 7 F.3d 344, 347 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “an exclusion applicable to 
one defendant applies to all co-defendants”); United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d 363, 368 
(7th Cir. 2008) (“The excludable delay of [the defendant’s] co-defendants is ascribed to 
him.”).  Applying § 3161(h)(1), we agree with the District Court’s holding that these 
outstanding pre-trial motions tolled the time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act and did 
not violate Dinzey’s rights.2 
Dinzey next contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
sustain the jury’s verdict of guilt for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and 
conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States.  Dinzey argues that the adduced 
evidence merely showed a “buy-sell agreement and no other substantive criminal 
objective,” such as a conspiracy, and, as such, his motion for a judgment of acquittal 
should have been granted.  “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant or 
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, 
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 Because we find that the pre-trial motions tolled the requirements of the Speedy 
Trial Act, we need not address the government’s assertion that Dinzey failed to preserve 
this issue on appeal. 
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applying the same standard as the district court.”3  United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 
206 (3d Cir. 2009).  Although our review is plenary, we are “particularly deferential” to 
the district court’s conclusions, and the “appellant carries a very heavy burden” in 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.”  United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173, 
175 (3d Cir. 2002).   
To establish a conspiracy, the government needed to prove “(1) a shared unity of 
purpose, (2) an intent to achieve a common illegal goal, and (3) an agreement to work 
toward that goal, which [Dinzey] knowingly joined.”  United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 
476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).  “These elements incorporate a requirement 
that [Dinzey] had knowledge of the specific illegal objective contemplated by the 
particular conspiracy,” namely, importing and distributing a controlled substance.  Id. 
(citations omitted).  The government presented testimony from several witnesses and 
numerous wire interceptions, which revealed Dinzey’s knowing and willing participation 
throughout the illegal conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine; the jury found the 
voluminous evidence persuasive beyond a reasonable doubt in reaching the guilty verdict.  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we must, we 
agree with the District Court’s conclusion that a rational trier of fact could have found the 
evidence – considered “in conjunction and as a whole” – to sufficiently establish each 
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 “A Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal obliges a district court to review the 
record in the light more favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational 
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the 
available evidence,” United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotations & citation omitted), and we “neither reweigh[ ] evidence, nor mak[e] an 
independent determination as to witnesses’ credibility,” United States v. Peppers, 302 
F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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element of the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.  See United States v. Brodie, 403 
F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In conducting the sufficiency inquiry, we do not view the 
government’s evidence in isolation.”) (alterations omitted).  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the District Court’s denial of Dinzey’s motion for acquittal as to sufficiency of the 
evidence. 
Finally, Dinzey argues that the District Court’s imposition of a 160-month 
sentence was unreasonable in light of Dinzey’s age (47 years old), acceptance of 
responsibility, and completion of a GED Diploma while incarcerated.  Because “the trial 
court [is] in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in light of the 
particular circumstances of the case,” United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 328 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citation and quotations omitted), “[t]he party challenging the sentence bears 
the ultimate burden of proving its unreasonableness, and we accord great deference to a 
district court’s choice of final sentence,” United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).  The District Court thoroughly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) factors in reaching its sentence determination, extensively discussing the 
seriousness of the offense, Dinzey’s history and characteristics, and the need to impose a 
sentence in parity with other similarly-situated defendants.  (S.A. at 61-65.)  Dinzey has 
failed to advance any substantive arguments establishing that the District Court’s analysis 
and ultimate conclusion were unreasonable or inconsistent with the sentencing 
guidelines, and we owe “great deference” to the District Court’s judgment.  Accordingly, 
we will uphold the sentence. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Dinzey’s conviction and sentence. 
